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WATERS OF THE STATE
INTRODUCTION
The Southern Nevada Water Authority, the agency that provides Las
Vegas with water, is in the process of building a massive pipeline from the eastern-
central part of Nevada to Las Vegas.' "This pipeline is a nearly-unprecedented feat
of engineering and water distribution and stands to move over 27 million gallons of
water [a] year." 2 Once completed, the pipeline will be one of the largest of its kind
in human history.
If the state of Nevada authorizes the state authority to push this project
forward, it would help solve a pressing water supply problem for its largest
population center: Las Vegas. But it will do so at the expense of less water for
existing rural users. This includes Native American tribes who have fought
mightily for decades to protect many of Nevada's rural water sources-including
water that plays important cultural roles for the tribes.4
You might imagine that there would be a clear answer to how the law
regulates these critical interests. However, that is not the case. The nature of state
powers and rights over the water within their territorial boundaries is unclear-that
includes the states' rights when it comes to its private citizens, neighboring states,
and the federal government.
Take Nevada itself which, by statute, has declared that "[t]he water of all
sources of water supply within the boundaries of the State whether above or
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Law of Property in Ecology Workshop, sponsored by the Property and Environment Research Center
and Center for Business Law & Regulation at Case Western Reserve University School of Law,
organized by Jonathan Adler. We are grateful for the input of all workshop participants, and have
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1. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 2:14-cv-00226-APG-VCF,
No. 2:14-cv-00228-APG-VCF 2017 WL 3667700, at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2017), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 17-17152, No. 17-17252, No. 17-
17263 2017 WL 7036679 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2017).
2. Id.
3. See Id.
4. Id. at 9 (addressing in part dispute over water that will impact Native American cultural sites).
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beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public."5 As the waters of Nevada
belong to the public, the state can presumably regulate water use (part of the state's
police power), protect water resources for the public (known in water law parlance
as the public trust doctrine), and go to court on behalf of the public's interest in
water (referred to as parens patriae powers). These sovereign powers and rights
would seem to give the state considerable control and even some duties over its
water, but not the sweeping ability to reallocate massive amounts of water at will-
which is what we might expect if the state actually owned the water.
But what if a similar proposal were floated in a different state facing water
allocation challenges, such as Wyoming. Wyoming's constitution provides: "The
water of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within
the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the state."6
This self-declaration of water ownership sounds like it gives the state
fundamentally different rights over water. It suggests that the state has a proprietary
power over all water within its territory. Perhaps the state could allocate and
reallocate water to private users, denying water use at will so long as it serves some
general governmental purpose.
If the water is simply state property, it can sell it off, hoard and store it for
future speculative uses, or simply give it away when politically convenient. And if
Wyoming owns the water within its borders, can it demand that its neighbors'
water use have no physical transboundary impacts, essentially drawing a property
line through the water cycle?
This article addresses some of the fundamental questions related to state
waters. First, what exactly is the state's interest in its territorial waters? Second,
what is meant by the oft-used term in water parlance: "waters of the state"? Does
"waters of the state" simply mean state ownership of water as a piece of physical
property? Or does it refer to the state's unique role as sovereign and steward over
its water, which is a complex regime of overlapping rights and duties stemming
from police powers, the public trust doctrine, the equal footing doctrine, and parens
patriae standing (as you can guess-the authors will argue)? Third, does it matter
how a state defines its waters? Finally, do state declarations about their water -
from hydrology to ownership - align with our notions of property and sovereignty?
We conclude that declarations of water as state-owned property are
fundamentally flawed. The United States Supreme Court long ago rejected
assertions of state ownership of natural resources. From its start, American law has
recognized that water by its nature cannot be one's property.9 Thus, states cannot
5. NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (2000).
6. WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; See also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101 (2017).
7. WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. Wyoming recognizes private appropriative rights based on priority
and beneficial use, the state can ultimately deny a private appropriative use when demanded by the
public interest.
8. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399-403 (1948) (rejecting state ownership theory of
wild resources).
9. See California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F.2d 555, 567, 573 (9th
Cir. 1934), aff'd sub nom. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
55 S. Ct. 725, 79 L. Ed. 1356 (1935) (collecting cases explaining that the corpus of water cannot be
owned).
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own water. Nor should they. The states can regulate water use pursuant to police
powers, protect public interests within our federal system pursuant to parens
patriae, and must even steward our water pursuant to the public trust doctrine.10
This article explores the "waters of the state" in three parts. First, we look
to what the states say for themselves about water in their constitutions and statutes.
This is not intended as a comprehensive survey, but rather a thorough sampling of
the diversity in how states assert themselves over territorial water. There is a
tremendous range in the scope of state assertions, in terms of both hydrologic (what
waters are included) and legal scope (what states can and should do with water).
The diversity and distinctions turn out to be of limited importance, though, at least
on the ground. Instead, as discussed in the remaining sections, the bounds of a
state's interests in its territorial waters are shaped by numerous other sources and
rules that don't seem to pay much attention to the state's own declarations, from
the quasi-Constitutional equal footing and public trust doctrines to interpretations
of Constitutional due process and jurisdiction.
Next, this article examines the rights and powers over "waters of the state"
beyond simple statutory assertions. State sovereign authority over territorial water
begins with the equal footing doctrine." States have a general police power to
regulate water use, subject to the rational basis test and due process limitations.12
States also have a sovereign and quasi-sovereign interest in their waters that they
can protect in state and federal courts through parens patriae." And the public trust
doctrine serves a dual role of empowering states to protect navigable waters while
constraining states from divesting themselves of public water resources.14
Finally, this article analyzes assertions that "waters of the state" amounts
to state ownership of water as property. This notion is an awkward fit with the
other state rights and powers over territorial water - at times it is redundant,
conflicting, and fundamentally inconsistent with other sovereignty doctrines. It is
also undermined by the Supreme Court's rejection of the state ownership theory of
natural resources." And most fundamentally, it is at odds with the very nature of
water, which cannot be reduced to what we call "property." The flow of water
transcends space and time, humbling intellectual and physical attempts at
ownership. Rather than trying to own water as property, states should focus on fair
allocation, long-term stewardship, and cooperative sharing within the federal
system.
10. See infra notes 11, 13, 14.
11. Kenneth K. Kilbert, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes Shores, 58 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 1, 19 (2010) (addressing equal footing doctrine in public trust context).
12. See Michele Engel, Comment, Water Quality Control: The Reality of Priority in Utah
Groundwater Management, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 491, 523 (1992) (discussing police power over water
resources).
13. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations: Does Massachusetts v.
EPA Open Standing for Generations to Come?, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 77-83, 91-93 (2009)
(discussing state standing to sue for public trust violations).
14. See Michelle Bryan Mudd, Hitching Our Wagon to A Dim Star: Why Outmoded Water Codes
and "Public Interest" Review Cannot Protect he Public Trust in Western Water Law, 32 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 283, 295 (2013) (discussing limitations and empowerments of public trust doctrine).




I. WHAT DO THE STATES HAVE TO SAY FOR THEMSELVES?
A logical place to start when attempting to understand the states'
relationship with water is with the sovereign states themselves.1 6 The specific
enumeration of federal power and reservation of the remaining authority to the state
means that states have substantial power when it comes to defining their
relationship with resources within their borders." As a negative document, the
Constitution uses the specific enumeration of federal power to empower the states
with plenary police power over many matters, including their common resources
and the wellbeing of their citizens. And the states have traditionally exercised
plenary police power over all non-navigable waters within their borders.19
Further, states are the closest sovereign to the people, so it makes
particular sense that they exercise broad authority over important local issues, such
as water resource use. Aside from states' constitutional power to proclaim their
relationship with water, there are normative reasons to prefer that states have wide
latitude to define the nature of their relationship with water.20 One of the oft-cited
benefits of the federalist system is that it fosters experimentation.21 And when it
comes to water, that may just be the silver bullet. States in the U.S. are in the best
position to identify specific water needs and experiment with solutions.2 2 Of
course, the state's water agenda may also be motivated by self-interest in
maximizing use of a shared national resource. Consequently, while we begin by
looking at what the states have to say for themselves, this will not be the last word
on the subject.
States have a lot to say about their relationship with water, beginning with
23
their constitutions and statutes. And no two states say exactly the same things.
The states are far from uniform in how they approach their elationship with water.
States not only say different things about their power over water but also notable is
16. See e.g., Elizabeth W. Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to
Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111 (2011).
17. See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 331, 336 (2004) (discussing the reservation of powers to the states).
18. See generally Christopher B. Serak, Note, State Challenges to the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act: The Case for A New Federalist Jurisprudence, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 311, 334-
35, 343 (2012) ("Stated another way, if the states are not treated as regulatory sovereigns, then they
cannot fulfill their role in the federal system, and the government cannot deliver the social and political
values inherent o Constitutional order.").
19. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 93 (1907) ("It is enough for the purposes of this case that
each state has full jurisdiction over the lands within its borders, including the beds of streams and other
waters."); See, e.g., California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64,
55 S. Ct. 725, 79 L. Ed. 1356 (1935) ("... all nonnavigable waters then a part of the public domain
became publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated states . . . ").
20. See generally Serak, supra note 18, 344-345 ("Experimentation and efficiency refer to the value
of having multiple, independent regulatory entities and the "economic efficiency [realized] through
competition among the states.").
2 1. Id.
22. We will not belabor here either the importance of state experimentation, because it is already
well discussed in the literature, or the value of experimentation in water management, for the same
reasons.
23. Kilbert, supra note 11, at 35.
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what some of them do not say. There are obvious gaps in what waters they claim an
interest in and what powers they say they have over those waters.
The assertions of state waters can be organized and sorted by both
hydrologic and legal scope. The hydrologic scope is physical - does the state
include only rivers, streams, and lakes, or does it cover the full path of the water
cycle, from rain to ground? Similarly, do waters of the state include artificially
created water or waters imported to the state? The legal scope can be even more
varied. Does the state claim territorial waters, of whatever hydrologic scope, as
property, either of the public or the state itself? Or does the state describe its waters
as something different than property, regardless of owner, such as a public trust?
To be clear, we do not intend to provide a comprehensive survey of state assertions
over water in constitutions and statutes. Rather, our sampling fits with our broader
analysis and suggests that state assertions are of limited value and other doctrines
and authorities control the bounds and substance of state water rights.
A. What Waters are Waters of the State?
States vary widely in the breadth of waters that they assert control over.
Some states claim an interest in every drop of water within their borders, either by
broadly saying they have an interest in "all water" or by describing every
conceivable type of water imaginable in their statutes.24 This group includes a wide
spectrum of states from around the country, including Montana,25 New
Hampshire,26 Alabama,2 7  Hawaii,2 8 New Jersey,29 Ohio,30  South Dakota,
Wyoming,32 Florida3 3 Pennsylvania,34 Utah,35 Vermont,36 California,37 Delaware,3 8
North Dakota,39 Virginia,40 and Connecticut.41 Montana's Constitution even grabs
24. For example, California, Nebraska, Georgia, Alabama, Hawaii, New Jersey, Ohio, South
Dakota, Wyoming, Florida, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Vermont all claim an interest in all water within
their state. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-1 to 12-5-586 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-3 (2017); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 58:1A-3 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1501.30 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-1-1
(2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101 (2017); FLA. STAT. §§ 373.012-373.71, 373.19 (2006); PA.
CONST. art. I, § 27; UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 901 (2007); NFB. REV.
STAT. § 46-202 (2014).
25. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-101 (2009).
26. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 481:1-488:11 (2013).
27. ALA.CODE §§ 9-10b-1 to 9-10b-30 (2018).
28. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-3 (2017).
29. N.J. REV. STAT. § 58:1A-3.
30. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1501.30 (2016).
31. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-1-1 (2004).
32. WYO. STAT. ANN. §41-3-101 (2017).
33. FLA. STAT. §§ 373.012-373.71, § 373.1 (2006).
34. PA. CONST. ART. I, § 27.
35. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (2017).
36. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 901 (2007).
37. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (2018).
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001, 6081-6084 (2017).
39. N.D. CENT CODE ANN. § 61-01-01 (2013).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-10 (2011).
41. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a (2015).
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"atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state" as the property of the
state.42
One narrow exception to state assertions over all territorial waters is
artificial water and/or water held in artificial bodies. This is primarily seen in
Western states such as Nebraska,43 Idaho,44 Texas,45 New Mexico,46 Arizona,4 7
Colorado,48 and Iowa.49 The exceptions may cover water in various artificial water
bodies such as built ponds and reservoirs. Alternatively, they may describe water
that was artificially introduced. This limitation is also seen in eastern states such as
Louisiana,0 Indiana,1 and Maryland,5 2 which have excluded imported water,
wastewater, and captured rainwater.
Another common distinction is based on the navigability of the water, a
concept that often also relates to the state's public trust doctrine as well as
numerous federal doctrines, discussed below. Some states use the term "public"
waters to describe waters under state control. Several states distinguish between
surface and groundwater, or water that is hydrologically connected to surface water
and that which isn't.54  But on balance, this turns out to not be a terribly
common problem. Most states either have broadly claimed state ownership over
virtually all intrastate waters, or their courts have interpreted the language to
effectively mean that. For example, Colorado courts have interpreted the "natural
stream" language broadly to mean all tributary waters.
At bottom, states have taken several distinct positions when it comes to
defining which waters are part of the "waters of the state." Next, we consider how
states characterize these waters.
B. How Do States Characterize Waters of the State?
Following the range of waters that states assert control over, next comes
the diversity of ways that states characterize their water. At one end of the
spectrum are states that claim to own the water as state property. This takes the
form of an outright statement that the state "owns" the water it claims, it has "title"
to it, it is the state's "property," or it is the "state's water." This includes
42. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
43. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-202 (2014).
44. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-101 to 42-5276 (2006).
45. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (2017).
46. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-1 (2015).
47. Ariz.Rev. Stat. § 37-1128(D)(7) (2014).
48. COLO. REV. STAT. 37-92-102 (2004).
49. IOWA CODE §§ 461A.1 to 461A.80; §461A.18 (2013).
50. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2071 to 2089 (2017); § 30:2073.
51. IND. CODE §§ 14-25-1-1 to 14-25-15-13 (2011).
52. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 5-101 (2017).
53. For example, Kentucky claims an interest in "public" waters. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.140
(2009).
54. For example, Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. 37-92-102 (2004).
55. For example, in Comstock v. Ramsay, a Colorado court said that water collected in a ditch was a
stream so that the state had complete ownership and control over the water. 55 Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107
(1913).
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Alabama,56 Hawaii, 7 New Jersey, Ohio,5 9 Louisiana, Maryland,61 Georgia,
Wyoming,63 and Texas.64
A number of states term water as property, but assert that it is property
owned by the "public." These states pan the geography of the United States and
include Florida,65 Pennsylvania,66 Utah,67 Vermont,68 Arizona,69 New Mexico,70
and Indiana." Some of these states say water is held by the public, but is subject to
appropriation, like California7 2 South Dakota,3 and Nebraska.7 4
Other states do not characterize water as property, whether owned by the
state or public. Instead, these states recognize water as a public good. For example,
Kansas declares that the water within its borders is not owned, but instead
"dedicated" to the use of everyone.5 Consistent with non-ownership, some states
explicitly frame their interest in water in terms of sovereignty and governance
instead of property, such as Montana,7 6 Delaware, North Dakota, Virginia,7 9 and
New Hampshire.o Similarly, some states such as Connecticut assert a public trust
doctrine for water as an affirmative alternative to water as property.8 1
Finally, states differ in what restrictions they place on themselves when it
comes to regulating water or using water. A group of states say that their power
over water is expressly limited to benefiting the public either under the public trust
doctrine or by listing out specific purposes the state should put the water towards,
such as conservation.82 Some states have specific restrictions on what the state can
56. ALA. CODE § 9-1OB-3 (2018).
57. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-3 (2017).
58. N.J. REV. STAT. § 58:1A-3 (2006).
59. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1501.30 (2016).
60. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2071 to 2089 (2017); § 30:2073.
61. MD. ENVIR. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (2017).
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-21 (2007).
63. WYO. CONST. ART. VIII, § 1; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101 (2017).
64 TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (2017).
65. FLA. STAT. § 373.016 (2006).
66. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
67. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (2017).
68. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 901 (2007).
69. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-101 (2012).
70. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-1 (2015).
71. IND. CODE. § 14-25-1-2 (2011).
72. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (2018).
73. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-1-1 (2004).
74. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-202 (2014).
75 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702 (2008).
76. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-101 (2009).
77. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6081-84 (2017).
78. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (2013).
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-10 (2011).
80. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481:1 (2013).
81. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-1 (2015).
82. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 373.016 (2006); PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (2017);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-101 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481:1.
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do with water. Idaho, for example, says that the state should consider "all interests"
of the public when handling water, but that perfected water rights "shall not" be
restricted unless a citizen fails to pay a water assessment.83
There are a few of takeaways here. First, some states have failed to claim
any interest in some of their waters. This leaves open questions about what to do
with the water that remains. Second, states themselves claim ownership over water
in different ways and from different sources-which could inform what they can
and cannot do with water. Finally, some states have expressly limited their powers
by defining what they can and cannot do with water. What is the significance of
these differences and distinctions? Do they define or alter a state's water rights and
powers? As the following section details, these state assertions lose much of their
significance when viewed in the overall context of doctrines and authorities that
control the balance of powers over "waters of the state."
II. STATE RIGHTS AND POWERS OVER TERRITORIAL WATERS
In our federal system, states have sovereignty over water within their
borders.84 Early in American history, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the
sovereign rights of states to territorial waters.8 5 In Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, the
Court held that the 13 original States, on behalf of the citizens of each, "hold the
absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them."86 Throughout
the nineteenth century, the Court held that this same principle applied to every state
as it entered the Union, vesting each with absolute "rights" to navigable water
within their borders, as co-equal sovereigns.87 This concept is referred to now as the
"equal footing doctrine."88 The equal footing doctrine stands for the simple
proposition that as each state entered the Union, it took control of waterbeds and
water within its borders as a matter of constitutional law and not as a matter of
Congressional vestment.89
The states thus have the power to allocate and govern these waterbeds,
and the water above, subject to "the paramount power of the United States to
control such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign
83. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-101 (2006).
84. See Note, Federal-State Conflicts Over the Control of Western Waters, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 967
(1960) (discussing state sovereignty over water at length).
85. See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 71 (1821).
86 Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842).
87 See, e.g., Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977); United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950); Knight v. U.S. Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891); Pollard v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 216 (1845); see also PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1219 (2012).
88 See PPL Montana, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1219.
89 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484 (1988); see also Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 49 (1894) ("And the territories acquired by congress, whether by deed of cession from the
original states, or by treaty with a foreign country, are held with the object, as soon as their population
and condition justify it, of being admitted into the Union as states, upon an equal footing with the
original states in all respects; and the title and dominion of the tide waters . . . are held by the United
States ... in trust for the future states."); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. at 216.
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commerce."90 Federal reserved rights for both tribal lands91 and other federal lands
further constrain state power over water.92 While the Supreme Court has not
applied reserved federal rights to groundwater,93 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently held that a tribe's rights do extend to groundwater.94 But that
leaves the important question: what about states' interests in water generally?
A. State Rights and Duties Over Intrastate Water Use: Police Powers and
the Public Trust Doctrine
From state sovereignty comes the state police power, a basic source of
state power over water.95 States may generally take any act "tending to promote the
health, peace, morals, education, good order, and welfare of the people."96Police
power is an attribute of sovereignty, an essential element of the power to govern,
and a function that cannot be surrendered. It exists without express declaration." 97
Managing, allocating, and regulating waters within a state are clearly within the
state's police power.98
But does sovereignty give a state a unique interest in its waters beyond the
basic police powers? In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, Justice Holmes put
forward a special sovereign role for states as stewards of the public interest in
water:
Few public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of
particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain the rivers that
are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as
the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the purpose of turning them to a
more perfect use. This public interest is omnipresent wherever there is a state, and
grows more pressing as population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of opinion
that the private property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed to have deeper
roots.... The private right to appropriate is subject not only to the rights of lower
owners but to the initial limitation that it may not substantially diminish one of the
great foundations of public welfare and health.99
The view of water as state property and the view that states merely have a
power over water are competing and at times inconsistent views of state interests in
90 See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); see also Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 551 (1981); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54 (1926); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 285 (1997).
91. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
92. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976).
93. The Supreme Court avoided the question by treating the underground water at issue as a surface
water below the surface, leaving the question of federal reserved rights for groundwater for a later day.
Id. at 142.
94. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1270
(9th Cir. 2017).
95. Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 153, 53 P.2d 615, 619 (1936).
96. Id. at 619.
97. Washington Kelpers Ass'n v. State, 81 Wash. 2d 410, 417, 502 P.2d 1170, 1174 (1972).
98. Id.; see also Barker v. State Fish Comm'n, 88 Wash. 73, 152 P. 537 (1915); State ex rel.
Campbell v. Case, 182 Wash. 334, 339, 47 P.2d 24 (1935).
99. Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
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water. So while a reallocation of private water rights based solely on police powers
may require compensation, the state would not owe anything for reallocating what
it "owns."
Next, the public trust doctrine is added to the mix. The Supreme Court has
described a state's rights and interests in water as a trustee for the public, which
came to be known as the public trust doctrine.100 In Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Illinois, the state had attempted to transfer a portion of the Lake Michigan shoreline
to a private company for economic development.101 The Supreme Court struck
down the giveaway of water resources, holding that the state cannot use, dispose, or
divest itself of these resources if there is "substantial impairment of the interest of
the public in the waters."1 02 This is a stricter standard that the state is subject to
when administering its sovereign police powers. The limitation on alienation is
totally at odds with administering a proprietary interest in water. Instead, the public
trust doctrine offers an alternative theory of state water control, distinct from police
powers and property. The Supreme Court explained the difference between title as
property and title pursuant o the public trust doctrine:
That the state holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters of
Lake Michigan, within its limits, in the same manner that the state holds title to
soils under tide water, by the common law, we have already shown; and that title
necessarily carries with it control over the waters above them, whenever the lands
are subjected to use. But it is a title different in character from that which the state
holds in lands intended for sale. It is different from the title which the United States
hold in the public lands which are open to pre-emption and sale. It is a title held in
trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters,
carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the
obstruction or interference of private parties.103
In short, states have significant power to regulate water stemming from
their basic sovereignty and their stewardship duties under the public trust doctrine.
Next, we consider what happens when these powers conflict with the rights of
those of the state's citizens.
B. When State Powers Conflict with Private Use of Water
State courts have advanced all three bases for state control of water in
various disputes, usually with private parties.' As described below, some courts
100. "The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with the principles of the law of
nature and the constitution of a well-ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of
the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It would be a grievance which never could be
long borne by a free people." Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 53 (1821).
101. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 433 (1892). Illinois Cent. R. Co. is cited in
Enbridge Annex II for the proposition "that most classes of natural resources (such as navigable waters)
belong to the public, while being held and protected by the government." This is a fair, if overly simple,
description of the public trust doctrine, and as discussed above and further in Part IV, is a fundamentally
difference concept than ownership as property.
102. Id. at 435.
103. Id. at 452.
104. See, e.g., Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982) (discussing state relationship
with water as one of police power and sovereignty, as well as the public trust doctrine's limitations on
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limit state rights to police powers, setting up otential takings cases over private
water rights.o Other state courts follow Justice Holmes' reasoning, giving states
sovereign authority over water that does not leave a compensable private interest to
be owned.106 And increasingly, state courts are adopting the public trust doctrine to
both empower the state to protect its water and restrict the state from divestment of
the public's resources.'o0
Private property interests in water can be murky upon first view. Water
cannot be privately owned; rather persons merely have rights in the use of water.
This means that private water rights are usufructuary (rights of use, not possession),
not fixed (they can fluctuate with conditions), and are generally based on either the
reasonable use doctrine (rights correlative to other rights) or prior appropriation
(rights based on the timing of capture). With these qualifications, states often
recognize private property rights in the use of water. States with prior appropriation
schemes historically favor private citizens more when it comes to conflicts between
the states and private citizens. That is because prior appropriation is a more
defined, specific property relationship. There are typically judicial decrees and a
specific license to use a specific amount of water. These more definite features
make it more likely that courts will support a private claim to water over a state.108
Setting aside the appropriation versus the riparian distinction, courts have
settled state versus private water claims in a few different ways. Some courts have
held that states have a superior right to all water within their borders and that all
private rights to water are subject to that superior state right.109 For example, courts
like those in Arizona and Minnesota have held that private citizens' usufructuary
rights in water mean that the state by definition has the supreme claim to control
water generally.110 In other words, states cannot take what they already own. One
theory here is that because many states have made it clear that they have broad
power over all water in their borders, private citizens have been on notice that any
right to water they may have is thus limited."' Thus, private citizens do not have a
compensable taking claim for water rights.1 1 2
the state's powers over water); see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 440-41 (Haw.
2000).
105. E.g., Phillips v. State ex rel. Dep't of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control, 449 A.2d 250, 256 (Del.
1982) (recognizing takings claim).
106. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77 P.3d 62, 77-78
(Colo. 2003) (finding state's sovereign authority valid basis for allocating water); see generally Russell
M. McGlothlin & Scott S. Slater, No Fictions Required: Assessing the Public Trust Doctrine in Pursuit
of Balanced Water Management, 17 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 53, 83-84 (2013) (discussing caselaw
finding no takings liability for water allocation).
107. See generally Mudd, supra note 14 at 330-33 (2013) (discussing use of public trust to limit and
empower states over water, and reviewing relevant case law).
108. See Ling-Yee Huang, Fifth Amendment Takings & Transitions in Water Law: Compensation
(Just) for the Environment, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 49, 59 (2007).
109. See, e.g., Pratt v. State Dep't of Natural Res., 309 N.W.2d 767, 772 (Minn. 1981).
110. Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1328 (Ariz. 1981), appeal dismissed,
457 U.S. 1101 (1982); Pratt, 309 N.W.2d at 772.
111. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 n.6 (1981).
112. Fox River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm'n ofWis., 274 U.S. 651, 657 (1927) (finding that the state
defines land rights and the state's refusal to grant a riparian owner the right to maintain and repair their
dam was not a denial of Fourteenth Amendment rights); Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617, 625 (D.
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In contrast, especially in Western states, some courts have had no problem
finding that states' interest is limited to police powers and that the state took private
water rights within the meaning of the Constitution, thus the private owner was
entitled to damages.1 13 Alaska, Idaho, Ohio, and Oklahoma courts, for example,
have entertained takings claims against the state.114 Courts have interpreted these
state Constitutions as vesting water-use property rights in private citizens.1 1 5
Consequently, there is an active water market in some of these states, and takings
claims are plausible.1 16
Nebraska's constitution says that "The right to divert unappropriated
waters of every natural stream for beneficial use shall never be denied except when
such denial is demanded by the public interest."17 This language suggests hat the
state would have the power to take water back from private citizens anytime it was
in the public interest. But courts have struck down state interferences with private
water rights, and noted in dicta, that interference with private water rights would
result in "confiscation of the company's property without due process or payment
of just compensation." 8
In particular, private parties have fared well in the Court of Federal
Claims and the Federal Circuit. In Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v.
United States, the Court held that California's reduction of State Water Project
deliveries to comply with the Endangered Species Act was a physical rather than a
regulatory taking.119 The court reached this conclusion because "the denial of a
right to the use of water accomplishes a complete extinction of all value," and "the
government has essentially substituted itself as the beneficiary of the contract rights
with regard to that water and totally displaced the contract holder."1 20 The Supreme
Kan. 1956), affd per curiam, 352 U.S. 863 (1956); Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran
(1984), 210 Mont. 38, 53, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (concluding that since the plaintiff had no claim to the
waters at issue there was no basis for a takings claim); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 733 (N.D.
1968) (upholding state law limiting water right to beneficial use); In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1092-
94 (Or. 1924) (limiting the extent of the right of a riparian water user).
113. See Estate of Hage v. United States (Hage V), 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 211 (2008) (noting the
difference between water ownership as the right to access and use water and landownership as the right
to exclude and then finding a taking based on the government fencing around the water and streams);
see also Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 405-08 (1931) (finding a taking of International
Paper's water rights).
114. Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 1191, 1194-95 (Alaska 1973) (finding riparian water rights are
subject to the Fifth Amendment and "[t]hese rights are valuable property, and ordinarily cannot be taken
for public use by the federal or state governments without payment of just compensation to the
landowner."); Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 252 P.3d 71, 79 (Idaho 2011) ("When there is
insufficient water to satisfy both the senior appropriator's and the junior appropriator's water rights,
giving the junior appropriator a preference to the use of the water constitutes a taking for which
compensation must be paid."); McNamara v. Rittman, 107 Ohio St.3d 243, 247, 838 N.E.2d 640, 645
(citing State ex. rel. Andersons v. Masheter, 1 Ohio St.2d 11, 12-13, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964)); Franco-
American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 1990 OK 44, ¶ 15, 855 P.2d 568, 576 (1990).
115. See, e.g., McNamara v. Rittman, 107 Ohio St.3d 243, 2005-Ohio-6433, 838 N.E.2d 640, ¶28.
116. Wernberg, 516 P.2d at 1197; Clear Springs Foods, 252 P.3d at 79; McNamara, 107 Ohio St.3d
at 243; Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd., 855 P.2d at 576.
117. In re Application A-16642, 463 N.W.2d 591, 599 (Neb. 1990).
118. Scottsbluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co., 53 N.W.2d 543, 547 (Neb. 1952).
119. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318-19 (2001).
120. Id. at 319.
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Court in Dugan v. Rank held that a government agency interfering with riparian
rights could be a taking that warrants repayment to the private owner.1 21 The
Supreme Court explained that the right was to the "flow of water in the San
Joaquin and to its use as it flows along the landowner's property."1 2 2 The court
emphasized that "[a] seizure of water rights need not necessarily be a physical
invasion of land. It may occur upstream, as here. Interference with or partial taking
of water rights in the manner it was accomplished here might be analogized to
interference or partial taking of airspace over land." 1 2 3
Many state courts have played out the sovereign-interest line in the sand to
defeat takings claims.1 24 For example, in Avenal v. State, an Alabama court
explained that "[t]he State cannot appropriate ... that which it already owns." 1 2 5
The court also emphasized, though, that the state was not taking resources to give
to another private individual, which supported the state's position.126 Other courts
have explicitly held that water is simply so important to the health and welfare of a
state that states should have unusually broad sovereign power to regulate water
127use.
Courts in Kansas and Minnesota have similarly reasoned that
constitutional grants of water to the public mean that states have a unique right to
allocate and restrict water use. 12 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Washington
explained in the context of a fishery case that the state "in its sovereign capacity,
owns [resources] in the waters of the state."12 9 It further explained that "the people
of the whole state" own these resources.130
In a similar vein, New Hampshire courts have held that the state has a
unique sovereign interest in water that trumps private rights:
No constitutional or statutory ordainment exists by which the plaintiff may
be held to have received any endowment of vested rights in public waters. The
State's ownership and control of them arise as an incident of its sovereignty, and
not from any taking of private property for public uses.
So while some courts have theorized that private citizens have no property
rights to water, others have held that there is a property right, but that the state still
has a superior claim so long as it is exercising its sovereign powers to ensure
121. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 625 (1963).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 733 (N.D. 1968).
125. Avenal v. State, 2003-3521, p. 30 (La. 10/19/04), 886 So. 2d 1085, 1106.
126. Id.
127. Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617, 625 (D. Kan.), affd, 352 U.S. 863 (1956); Baeth v.
Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 733.
128. See F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164 (Kan. 1981); Pratt v. State Dep't of Nat.
Res., 309 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1981).
129. Washington Kelpers Ass'n v. State, 502 P.2d 1170, 1174 (Wash. 1972).
130. Id. at 1173; See also State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 59 P.2d 1101 (Wash. 1936); Judd v. Bernard,
304 P.2d 1046 (Wash. 1956); Wiegardt v. State, 175 P.2d 969 (Wash. 1947); McMillan v. Sims, 231 P.
943 (Wash. 1925); Vail v. Seaborg, 207 P. 15 (Wash. 1922); State v. Tice, 125 P. 168 (Wash. 1912).
131. St. Regis Paper Co. v. N.H. Water Res. Bd., 26 A.2d 832, 839 (N.H. 1942).
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beneficial use of water to its citizens.13 2 Another limitation used by some courts
requires the state to give a private water owner a reasonable period before
restricting their water rights, thereby implying a reasonableness tandard to state
ownership of water.3 At one point, the Texas Supreme Court held that after
reasonable terms, a riparian's loss of water to the state is not a taking.1 34 However,
Texas courts are all over the place. They have historically held that the state has a
sovereign power over water, empowering it to take any action to protect water that
it believes is necessary for the public, even where a particular statute does not give
the state that power.1 5 But more recently, the Texas Supreme Court has held that
the state cannot restrict a landowner's groundwater use without compensation.136
Wisconsin courts have referred to "virtual state ownership of navigable
waters ... [which] does not implicate questions of eminent domain. The State has
no need to take what it already 'owns."'137 This conclusion was also reached by the
Court of Federal Claims in Klamath Irrigation District v. United States, which
stated that "[i]n applying these [takings] principles to water, it is important to
understand that the issue here is not who owns the water," making clear that the
state is the owner, not any private actor.
California's courts have developed a particularly specific position on state
ownership of water. In State v. Superior Court of Riverside County, the California
Court of Appeal explained the nature of its state's ownership of water at some
length.139 The court addressed the state ownership issue in an unusual context: it
132. See, e.g., Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900) (finding destruction of riparian water rights
did not have to be compensated because purpose was not abrogation, but rather, the improvement of
public waters granted by the Commerce Clause); Rivers and Harbors Act, Pub. L. No. 75-392, 50 Stat.
844, 850 (1937) (providing that Secretary of the Interior "may acquire by proceedings in eminent
domain, or otherwise, all lands, rights-of-way, water rights, and other property necessary for said
purposes"); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-99 (1958) (recognizing a property
right but finding no taking); Olson v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 666 P.2d 188, 191 (Idaho 1983);
Goodwin v. Hidalgo Cty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 58 S.W.2d 1092, 1094 (Tex. App.
1933); First Nat'l Bank v. Hastings, 42 P. 691, 692 (Colo. App. 1895) ("Water rights for irrigation are
regarded as real property.").
133. See, e.g., In re Adjudication of the Water Rights of Upper Guadalupe Segment of the
Guadalupe River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. 1982) ("[Affter notice and upon reasonable terms,
the termination of the riparians' continuous non-use of water is not a taking of their property.").
134. Id. at 444.
135. Goldsmith & Powell v. State, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
136. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 832 (Tex. 2012).
137. See also Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep't of Nat. Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶ 84 n.31, 833
N.W.2d 800, 820 n.31 (Wis. 2013
138. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. U.S., 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 515 (2005). See also People v. Truckee
Lumber Co., 48 P. 374, 374 (Cal. 1897) (affirming the trial court's injunction against a lumber mill's
pollution of water that killed fish within public waters, holding that the people of the state have the right
and power to protect and preserve the waters for the common use and benefit); People ex rel. Robarts v.
Russ, 64 P. 111, 112 (Cal. 1931) (involving the state's interest in navigation, not fish, but saying that
"[d]irectly diverting waters in material quantities from a navigable stream" or a non-navigable tributary
thereof may be enjoined as a public nuisance).
139. State v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 284 (2000).
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was interpreting an ownership policy provision in an insurance contract.1 40 In short,
the court needed to determine whether the state of California "owned" water.1 41
The court exhaustively reviewed the nature of California's sovereign
relationship with water, concluding that it regulated water, but did not own it.142
The court started with the legislative language in the statute, which gave all water
to the "people" of California.143 The court noted that this language did not
empower the state to take water for itself, nor did it empower individual people to
take water.144 This inability of the state to take outright possession of water,
indiscriminately, was the lynchpin for the court as this meant that the state did not
own the water within the traditional sense of the word. It also meant that the state
could regulate water broadly, but that its relationship was different from one of
title. 145 Even more interesting, the court emphasized that the state's rights to
regulate water could not be interfered with by private citizens-this also brought
the state's rights to water outside of the "ownership" gambit. 146
Colorado has held that restricting private water use, even in groundwater,
is not a taking.147 The court emphasized that under the state's prior appropriation
scheme "[t]he well owners neither hold title to the water in their wells, nor do they
have an unlimited right to use water from their wells. What they possess is a legally
vested priority date that entitles them to pump a certain amount of tributary
groundwater from their wells for beneficial use."148 The court concluded that
because there was no allegation that the state had violated its own water laws, there
could be no taking.149 In other words, the state gets to make its own rules, and as
long as it follows them, there is no taking.
Minnesota courts follow a similar course, explaining that "it is
fundamental, in this state and elsewhere, that the state in its sovereign capacity
possesses a proprietary interest in the public waters of the state. Riparian rights are
subordinate to the rights of the public and subject to reasonable control and
regulation by the state."5 o
New York courts, going back to the early 1900s, have classified the state's
relationship with water as regulatory not title-based. For example, New York's
High Court held that Niagara River was not owned by the state but despite that, the
140. Id.
141. Id. at 285.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 280.
144. Id. at 282.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 285. See also Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1021, 1035 (Md.
1993) (reaching similar conclusions in the context of an insurance dispute).
147. Kobobel v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res., 249 P.3d 1127, 1129-30 (Colo. 2011).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. State v. Kuluvar, 123 N.W.2d 699, 706 (Minn. 1963).
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state has "dominion and power to regulate" these waters.1 5 1 New York courts have
held that the state owns all fresh water, private or not, within the state.152
New York courts have distinguished between when a state is acting as a
sovereign with regard to water or merely as a private actor. 15' A New York court
held that restricting water for a "public use" was not a taking, so long as the water
comes from a public waterway.154 In that case "a sovereign act in the interests of
navigation" takes precedence over "the 'ordinary riparian rights' in a navigable
river incidental to the land."15 5 But these courts have noted that when the waterway
is not public, or the state is not acting for a sovereign purpose, the private user
wins.156 More recent cases suggest that the state allocating water in its sovereign
status does not invade any private protected interest.15 7 For example, Oregon courts
have held that "the State, in its sovereign capacity, owns the [resources] in its
waters."15 8
Hawaii's courts have similarly relied on sovereignty principles to
empower the state when it comes to private water rights, with limitations.159 The
Hawaii Supreme Court, in In re Water Use Permit Applications, explained that "in
granting land ownership interests . . . the Hawaiian Kingdom expressly reserved its
sovereign prerogatives '[t]o encourage and even to enforce the usufruct of lands for
the common good."' 160 In another case, the Supreme Court explained that this
sovereign power was limited:
[W]e find the public interest in the waters of the kingdom was understood
to necessitate a retention of authority and the imposition of a concomitant duty to
maintain the purity and flow of our waters for future generations and to assure that
the waters of our land are put to reasonable and beneficial uses. This is not
ownership in the corporeal sense where the State may do with the property as it
pleases; rather, we comprehend the nature of the State's ownership as a retention of
such authority to assure the continued existence and beneficial application of the
resource for the common good.161
In other words, the state can only trump private water rights if it can
specifically articulate how the common good is being protected. This rule was
applied by a Hawaii appellate court, which held that the state should not be granted
a water easement over private property because, although it theoretically had the
151. Niagara Cty. Irrigation & Water Supply Co. v. Coll. Heights Land Co., 98 N.Y.S. 4 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1906); see also Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co., 146 So. 249, 253 (Fla. 1933) (Florida takes a
similar approach); Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 260 (Wyo. 1900) (As does Wyoming).
152. In re City of Johnstown, 209 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984-85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961).
153. Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 57 N.Y.S.2d 777, 783-84 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 784.
156. Id.; see also Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 94 N.E. 199, 203 (N.Y. 1911).
157. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. N.J. Water Supply Auth., 511 A.2d 1194, 1195-97 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1986).
158. Union Fisherman's Co. v. Shoemaker, 193 P. 476, 481 (Or. 1920) ("The preservation of fish
and game has always been treated as being within the proper domain of the police power," which
includes "the whole sum of inherent sovereign power which the state possesses.").
159. See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications 9 P.3d 409, 443 (Haw. 2000).
160. Id. at 440-41.
161. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982).
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power to take one, it was required to articulate how the common good was served
by the easement.162 South Dakota is another example of a state whose courts have
held that the state has a sovereign, limited power over water, distinct from the
traditional sense of ownership. 163
Michigan courts have been aggressive about giving the state broad control
over water, based largely on public trust principles. The Michigan Supreme Court
explains how the public trust doctrine defines the state's interest in waters and what
is left for private ownership:
It will be helpful to recall that Michigan was carved out of the Northwest
Territory; that the Territory was ceded to the United States by Virginia; that the
United States held this territory in trust for future states to be created out of it; that
the United States held the waters of navigable rivers and lakes and the soil under
them in trust for the people, just as the British crown had formerly held them in
trust for the public uses of navigation and fishery; that when Michigan entered the
union of states, she became vested with the same qualified title that the United
States had; that these waters and the soil under them passed to the state in its
sovereign capacity, impressed with a perpetual trust to secure to the people their
rights of navigation, fishing, and fowling.
Now, it being the fact that the State of Michigan acquired title to all of the
beds of its navigable waters in perpetual trust for the preservation of the public
right of navigation, fishing, etc., and Pine river being navigable, how has it come
about that the plaintiff, as riparian owner, has secured a title unimpressed with this
trust? The answer is that he has no such title. If he has derived his title by purchase
and grant from the State, he has taken it subject to the same trust with which it was
impressed while vested in the State.164
Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington recognize "the connection between water
rights and the public trust law."165 A Hawaii court explained that water is "different
in character from that which the state holds in lands intended for sale .. . [i]t is a
162. In re Will of Campbell, 307 P.3d 163, 175 (Haw. Ct. App. 2013), as corrected (Aug. 7, 2013).
163. Parsons v. City of Sioux Falls, 272 N.W. 288, 291 (1937).
164. Collins v. Gerhardt, 211 N.W. 115, 117 (1926); State v. Venice of Am. Land Co., 125 N.W.
770 (1910) (holding that the state of Michigan retained title to the Great Lakes and Lake of St. Clair,
and maintained the public trust in both); State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 665 (1980) ("Nonetheless,
we can no more close a public waterway because some of those who use it annoy nearby property
owners, than we could close a public highway for similar reasons. In any event, the state sought a
decision that would protect its right to this stream. With that right, which we now recognize, goes a
responsibility to keep it as God made it.").
165. See Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60-61 (Alaska 1996) (recognizing the public trust doctrine as
established in the Alaskan Constitution); San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct. ex rel. Maricopa, 972
P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999) (rejecting the legislature's intent to abolish the public trust doctrine);
Kootenai Envtl. All., Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983) (citing the
reasoning of Nat'l Audubon Soc'y in recognition of the public trust doctrine); In re Water Use Permit
Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445, 453 (Haw. 2000) (citing the reasoning of Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y in
recognizing the public trust doctrine, which is also established in the Hawaiian Constitution); Montana
Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179, 185-86 (Mont. 2011) (recognizing the
existence of the public trust doctrine for recreational use of Montana's waters); Lawrence v. Clark Cty.,
254 P.3d 606, 612-13 (Nev. 2011) (acknowledging that water within Nevada belongs to the public and
provides grounding for the public trust doctrine).
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title held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of
the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed
from the obstruction or interference of private parties . . . "166
These cases paint a mosaic of approaches to state interests in water
resources. The bulk of states and state courts recognize that states have some sort
of affirmative sovereign power over water that is distinct from either traditional
property theories or the limitations of the public trust doctrine. The nature of that
power is nebulous and certainly not universal. Indeed, some states do not seem to
give the state much power separate from what any private citizen has. But on
balance, most states do claim a special sovereign power over water, and for many,
it is subject to the public trust doctrine. With that, we turn to the state's powers
related to interstate waters and the ability for states to sue on behalf of their citizens
under the parens patriae doctrine.
C. State Rights to Interstate Waters and Parens Patriae Standing
The nature and source of state water rights has also been explored in
various federalism disputes and conflicts between neighboring states. The federal
government often steps on the states' toes when it comes to water and vice versa.
This includes state authorizations of water draws that somehow involve federal
lands or waterways and also competing federal water uses. 167 If states have a
deeper sovereign ownership interest over their water, perhaps there are reasons to
rethink some of our federal water concepts. Thus, the question of state ownership is
important to settling state versus state interests in water.168 The stage was set for
this issue in the recent case of Mississippi v. Tennessee, which involved a claim
that a state actually owned the corpus of its water.1 69
Recently, state governments have increasingly advanced social change
and protected important interests via the state's parens patriae powers which allows
a state to sue on behalf of the collective interests of a state's citizens. This vehicle
could empower states to further control water within its borders, merely by arguing
that someone or something is threatening a state's collective citizens' interest in the
water supply or quality.
The doctrine of parens patriae originated in English common law and was
first incorporated into American law in a series of United States Supreme Court
cases early in the twentieth century.17 0 Parens patriae means "parent of the
166. Hawaii Cty. v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 63 (1973) (internal citation omitted).
167. See, e.g., State of Ariz. v. State of Cal., 373 U.S. 546,597-98 (1963) (discussing federal rights
to reserve water from states).
168. Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2916 (2015).
169. Id. In a prior work, the co-authors thoroughly analyzed the Mississippi v. Tennessee dispute and
respective arguments. We concluded that Mississippi's state ownership argument was misguided (at
best) given the Court's precedents, including equitable apportionment. See e.g., Noah D. Hall & Joseph
Regalia, Interstate Groundwater Law Revisited: Mississippi v. Tennessee, 34 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 152, 166
(2016). Christine Klein analyzed the same dispute in a subsequent work as the case progressed further
and reached essentially the same conclusions. See Christine A. Klein, Owning Groundwater: The
Example ofMississippi v. Tennessee, 35 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 474 (2017).
170. Justin Pidot & Megan Moses, Ending Tax Revenue Standing, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 2
(2013), http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-onlinearticle/2013/8/4/ending-tax-revenue-standing.html.
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country."17 1 States have sovereign interests, such as the interest in being recognized
as sovereign by other states and the ability to legislate to govern its citizens.172
States also have private interests, such as its interest in privately owned property or
goods. Quasi-sovereign interests stand apart from both sovereign interests and a
state's private interests. They consist of a set of interests that the state has in the
well-being of its populace. That a parens patriae action could rest upon the
articulation of a "quasi-sovereign" interest was first recognized in Louisiana v.
Texas. 1 7  Louisiana unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a quarantine by Texas.1 74 The
Court explained that "[i]nasmuch as the vindication of the freedom of interstate
commerce is not committed to the State of Louisiana," that this claim did not assert
"any infringement of the powers of the State of Louisiana, or any special injury to
her property, but as asserting that the State is entitled to seek relief in this way
because the matters complained of affect her citizens at large."
Today, the doctrine provides an avenue for states to bring a claim to
protect its quasi-sovereign interests in water. The parens patriae doctrine allows a
state to sue to protect any of its quasi-sovereign interests-and courts have
extended that to interests in water. States have had some success with parens
patriae in the water context. 17 tarious courts have held that the doctrine
specifically protects a state's interest in water. 177 Notably, this sort of claim does
not require the state to have any property interest in water.178 On the other hand,
171. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982).
172. Georgia v. Penn. R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945).
173. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900).
174. Id. at 11-12.
175. Id. at 19.
176. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 856 (2010) ("State's sovereign interest in
ensuring that it receives an equitable share of interstate river's water is precisely the type of interest that
state, as parens patriae, represents on behalf of its citizens."); Md., Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1067 (D. Md. 1972) (addressing damage claim in a parens patriae capacity for
injury to its waters and marine life allegedly resulting from marine oil spills, and holding that the state
may care for its own in utilizing the boundaries of nature within her borders because it has "technical
ownership" of such boundaries or, when ownership is in no one, because the state may for the common
good exercise all the authority that technical ownership ordinarily confers); State, Dep't of Envtl. Prot.
v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 351 A.2d 337, 338 (1976) (the state of New Jersey brought an action
against defendant public utility to recover damages, as parens patriae, because of the death of a large
number of menhaden fish, allegedly caused by the sudden flow of cold water into a stream in connection
with the defendant's operation of a nuclear power plant. Affirming the lower court's judgment in favor
of the state, the court rejected the defendant's contention that he state did not have a proprietary right to
the fish in its waters sufficient to support an action.).
177. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 559-64 (1851)
(holding original jurisdiction appropriate for state plaintiff bringing public nuisance claim against
diverse party for obstruction of navigable water due to bridge construction and location).
178. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 218 (1901) (holding that no property rights were implicated,
but that a state could nevertheless challenge the defendant's pollution of water to protect state citizens);
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (recognizing that a state had authority to challenge water
diversions merely because the state represented its citizens interest in the water); Hudson Cty. Water Co.
v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) ("But it is recognized that the state, as quasi-sovereign and
representative of the interests of the public, has a standing in court to protect the . . . water . .. within its
territory, irrespective of the assent or dissent of the private owners of the land most immediately
concerned."); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 400 (1929) (allowing a state to challenge a water
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parens patriae is a theory of standing, which requires the state to identify some
cause of action it can bring on behalf of its citizens.
In this section, we have explored the complicated relationship between
states and water. There was a lot to unpack, including states' police powers over
water, their powers over interstate waters, and more. If one thing is clear, it is that
states have a robust sovereign power over water. However, as we conclude in the
next section, this power is not one of property.
III. DO STATES OWN WATER AS PROPERTY?
State sovereignty over water is well established, and the public trust
doctrine is increasingly taking hold, leaving little room for the idea, and
application, of state ownership of water as property. Further, state ownership of
natural resources has been rejected by the Supreme Court, and the very concept of
water as property is flawed.1 79 But the language of property, ownership, and related
terms (e.g., "title") has enduring power, despite the precedential and logical
opposition.
A. The Life and Death of the State Ownership Theory in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court caused much of the confusion regarding water as
property, in cases before and near the turn of the nineteenth century, by using
language indicating that states had actual title in water, not just the power to
regulate them. For example, in Donnelly v. United States, the Court said "that the
title of the navigable waters, and the soil beneath them, was in the state, and subject
to its sovereignty and jurisdiction."8 0 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a
trio of cases addressed ownership of water creatures and water beds, which are
resources generally lumped together with the disposition of the water itself.18
draw because of the draw's impacts on the state's citizens); People of California v. United States, 180
F.2d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 1950) (Allowing state of California to bring Parens Patraie lawsuit in lawsuit
quieting title to water. "The State of California is entitled to intervene as of right on each of the claimed
grounds, not only in its proprietary capacity as asserted absolute owner of the water in suit, but also in
its capacity as parens patriae.").
179. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 950 (1982).
180 Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 260 (1913) (emphasis added). Notably, state cases
around the nation had already weighed in and often found sovereign ownership of water suspect. See,
e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (1821) ("The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot,
consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well-ordered society, make
a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It
would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free people.").
181 See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896) (discussing the nature of "the air, the water
which runs in the rivers, the sea, and its shores . . . [and] wild animals" all having been relegated to the
"negative community."), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); See also Utah Div. of
State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987) (discussing "ownership of submerged lands-
which carries with it the power to control navigation, fishing, and other public uses of water"); Gypsum
Res., LLC v. Masto, 672 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1139 (D. Nev. 2009) (discussing the disposition of feraue
resources such as "nature of the air, water, and wildlife resources"); Washington Kelpers Ass'n v. State,
502 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Wash. 1972); Dale D. Goble, Three Cases / Four Tales: Commons, Capture, the
Public Trust, and Property in Land, 35 ENVTL. L. 807, 828 (2005) ("The king's prerogative ownership
of royal fishes, in other words, was part of his ownership of navigable waters because the greater
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These cases have been the primary ammunition for proponents of state water
ownership theories.18 2 In these cases, states raised their ownership over resources as
a shield against federal doctrines, namely the dormant commerce clause and the
privileges and immunity clause.8 Thus, the Court was forced to deeply engage
with the state ownership question.184
The facts of these cases are similar: a state wanted to allow its own
citizens to have certain privileges over natural resources within their borders, while
at the same time withholding these same privileges from citizens of other states.8 5
The outsiders responded by citing the privileges and immunity or dormant
commerce clause, arguing that a state could not discriminate or burden interstate
commerce in this way.1 86 The states arguing for control of the water riposted: we
own these wild resources, and we can allocate our property to our citizens as we
see fit. 1 7
In 1823, in Corfield v. Coryell, Justice Washington explained that New
Jersey could prevent citizens of other states from harvesting oyster beds within
New Jersey.8 The Court reasoned that New Jersey owned these beds, and that "in
regulating the use of the common property of the citizens of [a] state, the
legislature is [not] bound to extend to the citizens of all the other states the same
advantages as are secured to their own citizens."1 89
This set the stage for McCready v. Virginia, which was decided roughly
thirty years later.190 The Court held that Virginia, on behalf of its citizens, held "a
property right, and not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship" in the water
beds.191
Then about wenty years later, in Geer v. Connecticut, Connecticut tried to
control who could take game birds living within its boundaries, and a challenge
was brought under the commerce clause.192 The Court left little doubt that it
believed that the state, on behalf of its citizens, owned the wild game within its
includes the lesser."); James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths-A History of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 82 (2007).
182. See generally Goble, supra note 181, at 833-34.
183. See, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230) (analyzing
privileges and immunity clause conflict with state ownership of wildlife).
184 Prior cases sometimes referred to state ownership of water, but there was little reason for the
Court to figure out what sovereign ownership would mean on the ground. See, e.g., Martin v. Lessee of
Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842) (not addressing whether states actually owned or could convert each
other's water).
185. For example, in Corfield, the state wanted to restrict oyster beds to state citizens. See Corfield,
6 F. Cas. at 552.
186. See id.
187 See id.
188. Id. at 551-52.
189 Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
190 McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
191 Id. at 394.
192 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1896) (again, this case concerned wild game, not




borders, and that this ownership was powerful enough to defeat commerce clause
193concerns.
Finally, a decade after Geer, the Court addressed similar issues, this time
directly in the context of water, in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter.194 There,
the Court upheld a New Jersey statute prohibiting the transfer of waters out of
state. 195 The Court reasoned that "the constitutional power of the state to insist that
its natural advantages hall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not dependent upon
any nice estimate of the extent of present use or speculation as to future needs."196
Some language in Hudson explicitly couched the state's water interest as
"property." 197 Furthermore, the Court relied heavily on Geer, which the Court
would explain many years later, when it overturned this case, "was premised on the
theory that the state owned its wild animals and therefore was free to qualify any
ownership interest it might recognize in the persons who capture them."198
However, it is worth looking closely at the language the Court used here.
Although deferential to the state, the Court spoke about water in Hudson very
differently than it spoke of other wild resources in McCready, Geer, and
Corfield.199 The Court's hesitance to attach the "property" label to water, even in
this time of extreme deference to state ownership interests, is palpable. The Court
does not say that states "have title" to water-as it had when talking about oysters
and water beds in Corfield and McCready.200 Nor did the Court say that states
"owned" water, as it had when talking about wild birds in Geer.201 Instead, the
Court was careful to base its decision in Hudson on a "principle of public interest
and the police power, and not merely as the inheritor of a royal prerogative."202 The
Court repeatedly described state interest as one of "protecting natural resources,"
not protecting state title.203 The Court made this clear by stating "the state, as quasi-
sovereign and representative of the interests of the public, has a standing in court to
protect the atmosphere, the water, and the forests within its territory." 204
Although the Court in some early cases used language about state
"ownership," practically, it was not treating state interest in wild resources as a
property right.205 As Trelease explains eloquently in his treatise, nothing the Court
193. Id. at 529 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (notably, Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that the ownership
theory could not allow the state to interfere with interstate commerce (citing id. at 542-44)).
194 Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
195 Id. at 356.
196. Id. at 356-57.
197. Id. at 356 (discussing state interest in water, and stating "[w]hat it may protect by suit in this
court from interference in the name of property outside of the state's jurisdiction, one would think that it
could protect by statute from interference in the same name within").
198 See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 950 (1982).
199. See Hudson, 209 U.S. at 356.
200 See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa.1825) (No. 3,230); McCready v.
Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394-95 (1877).
201. Compare Hudson, 209 U.S. at 356 with Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1896).
202 Hudson, 209 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added).
203. Id. at 355.
204. Id.
205 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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did during this early period required it to recognize a true ownership interest over
water in any state; everything the Court did could better be characterized, as a
practical matter, in terms of police power principles and principles of state interest
in local affairs, similar to what was happening in the commerce clause
jurisprudence at the time.206 Considering the movement for state ownership of the
public domain, and the push for commerce clause restrictions on local interests,
there is no practical reason to view the contemporary water cases as turning on
property principles.207
After the turn of the century, the Supreme Court began to expressly settle
the state ownership issue, revealing that states never "owned" water or wild
resources at all.2 08 It was a mere fiction, or stand-in, for the police power that states
hold to regulate common resources. McCready ended up being the high water mark
for state ownership of wild resources - and even perhaps high above the water
mark. 209 Every time the states have tried to raise some sort of ownership theory
over water and other wild resources since McCready, they have sorely lost.2 10
Indeed, the state wild resources ownership theory has been trounced in a number of
different contexts.2 11
By the 1940s the Court rejected the state ownership theory altogether.2 12
Toomer v. Witsell addressed a challenge to South Carolina's shrimping statute,
which clearly discriminated against citizens of other states.21 The state,
206 Trelease, infra note 247, at 644 ("As for interstate rights, the United States Supreme Court has
on numerous occasions apportioned the waters of interstate rivers among states without reference to
state stream ownership, using instead concepts of sovereignty or parens patriae."). Trelease also points
out that states during this early period relied on their plenary police powers to apportion water between
their own citizens, not a state title tracing theory. Id.
207 See infra note 206, infra note 208, and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920); see also California-Oregon Power Co.
v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158, 163-64 (1935) (stating the act "effected a severance
of all waters upon the public domain . . . from the land itself," and that therefore "all nonnavigable
waters then a part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the
designated states").
209. It turns out the U.S. Supreme Court's modern cases were perhaps more intuitive than even the
Court realized. The decision that states can't own water under the early court's conceptualization of
derivative ownership on behalf of a state's citizens now makes sense in light of state law cases because,
as discussed below: individuals can't "own" water either.
210. Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority Under
Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 254 (2006) (explaining that "[o]ver the
years, the states have advanced a variety of arguments to the effect that the Constitution somehow
prevents the federal government from intruding on their sovereignty over water" but that these
arguments have largely failed).
211. Julia R. Wilder, The Great Lakes As A Water Resource: Questions of Ownership and Control,
59 IND. L.J. 463, 473 (1984) (discussing that, under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence after the turn of
the century, it became clear that "[g]overnment ownership of water is actually a legal fiction which
supports the state's regulatory powers, a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its
people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource"
(citations omitted)); B. Abbott Goldberg, Interposition-Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9
n.46 (1964) (discussing how the "ownership of water" is a "bit of legal mysticism" and that the
"confusion between the attributes of ownership and authority has persisted to this day").
212. Toomerv. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
213. Id. at 388.
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unsurprisingly, touted McCready, contending that South Carolina's ownership of
the shrimp, on behalf of its citizens, was a privileges and immunities shield.2 14
The Court first distinguished McCready because the Court there addressed
stationary oysters planted in beds, whereas Toomer addressed migratory shrimp.2 1 5
Like it did in Missouri vs. Holland, the Court found important the fact that the
shrimp at issue here were "migratory."2 16 But the Court then went farther, calling
into question the entire concept of states owning wild resources: "The whole
ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in
legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve
and regulate the exploitation of an important resource."2 17 The Court thus explained
that when courts say states "own" wild resources, they really mean that states have
the power to regulate the resource vis-A-vis their own citizens 2 18
After Toomer, the Court continued to reject state ownership theories over
wild resources in dormant commerce clause cases.219 The Court also continued to
reject state ownership theories when a state violated the privileges and immunity
clause.2 2 0 The Court continued to reject state ownership theories where federal
powers conflicted with state "ownership" claims.2 2 1 Indeed, the fiction of state
ownership of wild resources reached even Congress' attention:
[W]hat we really mean by this sort of 'ownership' is sovereignty, not
proprietorship .... One may not shoot the birds or appropriate the water without a
permit from the State, in its exercise of the police power. Nevertheless, title does
not come from the State's permit, but from the act of reducing the birds or the
222
water to possession with the assent of the State as sovereign, not as proprietor.
In the 1970s, the Court authored several opinions ending what debate was
221
left over the state ownership theory. In 1977, in Douglas v. Seacoast Products,
Inc., the Court rejected the argument that Virginia's "ownership" of fish swimming
in its territorial waters allowed the State to forbid nonresidents from fishing.224 The
Court pulled no punches this time:
A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a private game
preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish, birds, or animals.
214. Id. at 400-01.
215. Id. at 401.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 402.
218 Indeed, the Court seemed to call into question whether McCready should remain good law:
"These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the McCready exception to the privileges and
immunities clause, if such it be, should not be expanded to cover this case." Id.
219. See Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 8 (1928) (holding that Louisiana could
not use an ownership theory to require the local processing of shrimp taken from Louisiana); Takahashi
v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1948) (holding that an ownership theory over fish
could not save California's attempt to prevent certain residents from fishing); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, (1911).
220 Toomer, 334 U.S. at 400-01; Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419-21.
221 Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1977); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426
U.S. 529, 542-45 (1976).
222 Toomer, 334 U.S. at 400-01; Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419-21.
223 See, e.g., Douglas, 431 U.S. at 265.
224 Id. at 284.
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Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman
225
or hunter, has title to these creatures.
The Court put the early twentieth century cases in perspective: "The
'ownership' language of cases [such as Geery and McCready] . . . must be
understood as no more than a 19th-century legal fiction." 2 2 6 The Court concluded
that a state's interest in wild resources is simply a question of "police power."227
Finally, in Hughes v. Oklahoma2 28 the Court dispelled the ownership
theory, then did so again in Sporhase v. Nebraska,2 29 stating there that the Court
had already "traced the demise of the public ownership theory and definitively
recast it as 'but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its
people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an
important resource."230
Sporhase is worth considering further because it addressed a state's
interest in groundwater specifically.2 3 1 The Court first recognized that Geer had been
overturned, which signaled "the demise of the state ownership theory" over wild
233resources.232 It then considered whether the nature of groundwater required a
different approach.2 3 3 The Court concluded it did not, explaining that the idea that a
state can shield itself by asserting ownership over water "is still based on the legal
fiction of state ownership."234 The Court recognized the profound interest states,
especially western states, have in groundwater resources.23 5 But the Court clarified
that these interests were just that, interests to be calculated when applying doctrines
that settle water and commerce disputes,236 not ownership interests.237 The Court
also explained that groundwater implicates a number of important interstate and
national issues, which further militate against viewing state groundwater as an




228 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
229 Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
230 Id. at 951; see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 334-35.




235. Id. at 952.
236 Id. at 953.
237 Id.
238. Id.; see also Frank J. Trelease, State Water and State Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56
U. COLO. L. REV. 347, 355 (1985) (noting that Sporhase listed several factors which might militate in
favor of deferring to state preferences over water: "(1) the state might act to protect the health and safety
of its citizens; (2) the state might have legal expectations created by equitable apportionment or compact
division of interstate streams; (3) the state's claim to public ownership of ground water might be strong
enough to support a limited preference for its own citizens; and (4) to the extent that conservation made
water available, the state might be regarded as a producer of goods and might favor its own citizens in
their distribution"); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (not
recognizing Oklahoma's sovereign right to water within its borders).
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B. Water is Not Property
The Supreme Court's skepticism of state ownership and water as state
property is consistent with centuries of English and American water law that has
generally rejected the idea that water can be owned as property by anyone.239 Water
rights do not, as a species of property, fall within our normal sense of property in
land and chattels.240 Unlike land and buildings, water in natural watercourses is
neither static nor well-defined; it moves and it changes. As the famous maxim goes
"One cannot step into the same stream twice."241 "Running water at one instance is
at one place in the river, then it is gone and some other water has succeeded it,
without anyone having been able to tag it as his own; a thing in continual motion
and ceaseless change, incapable of possession or ownership in that condition."242
Western civilizations have been wrestling with the question of sovereign
ownership of water resources since at least the Roman Code of Justinian.243
Justinian's Code put sovereign property relationships into two categories:
- - -244
sovereign dominium and sovereign imperium. Imperium is an exercise of
sovereign authority over something-it may sometimes look like property, but in
reality, it is just the government's ability to regulate something.245 Dominium is a
tangible property right.246 Courts and scholars have often pointed to Justinian's
239. See Hall & Regalia, supra note 169, at 166.
240. An entire article could be devoted to the definition of "property" and what the concept means,
filled entirely with prior cited works. We simply refer our readers to two of our favorites: GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PENALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY (2012), and PETER
M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY (2013).
241. David B. Anderson, Water Rights As Property in Tulare v. United States, 38 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 461, 473-74 (2007) (citations omitted).
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., Gail Osherenko, New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding Property
Rights and the Public Trust, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 317, 350 (2006). The Justinian Code is worth
considering given that legal authorities have often cited it as the basis of U.S. water allocation
jurisprudence. See Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987) ("The principle that the public
has an overriding interest in navigable waterways and lands under them is at least as old as the Code of
Justinian .. . ." (citations omitted)); State v. Central Vermont Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128, 1130 (Vt. 1989)
("The public trust doctrine is an ancient one, having its roots in the Justinian Institutes of Roman law."
(citations omitted)); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); Mont.
Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984) ("The theory underlying this
doctrine can be traced from Roman Law through Magna Carta to present day decisions."); Cynthia L.
Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono Lake Controversy, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 544-45 (1995); Michael Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving
Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 713 (1995) ("The trust doctrine's common law origins
can, in fact, be traced back to medieval England and ultimately to Roman law. Consequently, there are
sound historical and conceptual reasons for grounding the public trust in common law." (footnote
omitted)).
244. Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA
GRANT L.J. 13 (1976); Darcy Alan Frownfelter, The International Component of Texas Water Law, 18
ST. MARY'S L.J. 481, 492 n.65 (1986) ("Imperium is governmental power to regulate.").
245. See Avenal v. State, 2003-3521, p. 3 0 (La. 10/19/04), 886 So. 2d 1085, 1106; See also Toomer
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, n.210 (1948).
246. Deveney, supra note 244, at 13 ("While on land, governments have both imperium and
dominium, the law is quite different with regard to the seas. Both scholarly and lay literatures frequently
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Code for the proposition that water cannot be "owned", or in other words, that
sovereigns can only have a relationship of imperium with water, by citing the
phrase "all of these things are by natural law common to all: air, flowing water, the
sea and, consequently, the shores of the sea."247 Or, in more contemporary terms
discussed above, water is not the state's property; rather it's a public trust for which
the state is merely a trustee.
Early England tended to view virtually all resources, including water, as
the sovereign's property.248 This theory that states could "own" water was not
without critics.249 For example, Lord Hailsham's famous summary of English law
explained that "[a]lthough certain rights as regards flowing water are incident to the
ownership of riparian property, the water itself, whether flowing in a known and
defined channel or percolating through the soil, is not, at common law, the subject
of property or capable of being granted to anybody."2 50
As early as the start of the nineteenth century, an increasing number of
English authorities began shifting to the tenets that scholars had heralded for
centuries: water cannot be owned, even by sovereigns. In 1823, in Wright v.
Howard, the High Court of Chancery explicitly stated that "there is no property in
the water."25 1 In 1832, in Mason v. Hill, Lord Denman noted that "[n]o one ha[s]
any property in the water itself," and explained that England had adopted into the
common law this principle that the corpus of water was not the subject of
fail to distinguish between imperium and dominium, thus eroding the distinction between the exercise of
authority and the entitlements of ownership.").
247. Anderson, supra note 241, at 475 ("Roman law did not distinguish among the many forms of
fresh water in nature: clouds, rain, diffused surface water, stream flow, river underflow, percolating
groundwater, vapor, lakes, flood water, seepage, etc. Because of the fugitive and fluctuating character of
water in its natural state, Roman law denied the existence of property in water altogether- including
running water-and held the use of rivers and lakes to be the common right of everyone, like the sea and
the air."); Frank J. 247247, Government Ownership of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638, 640 (1957) (Roman
law also distinguished between things which are "res nullius, the property of no one, along with the air,
the sea, and wild animals, or as res communes, common things owned by everyone."); Geer v.
Connecticut., 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979)
(discussing water ownership in terms of a "negative community of interest") (More modern scholars
often refer to this concept of not recognizing property interests in water and other natural resources as a
"negative community of interest.") ("The first of mankind had in common all those things which God
had given to the human race. This community was not a positive community of interest, like that which
exists between several persons who have ownership of a thing in which each have their particular
portion. It was a . . . 'negative community,' which resulted from the fact that those things which were
common to all belonged no more to one that to the others ... That which fell to each one among them
commenced to belong to him in private ownership, and this process is the origin of the right of property.
Some things, however, did not enter into this division, and remain, therefore, to this day, in the
condition of the ancient and negative community.. .. These things are those which the juris consults
called 'res communes' - the air, the water which runs in the rivers, the sea, and its shores.") (citing
ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, TRAITt DU DROll DE PROPRIETE, Nos. 27-28 (Chez Debure ed., 1772)).
248. See LORD HALE, DE JURE MARIS, chs. 4,6.
249. See, e.g., HENRICUS DE BRACTONA, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLAF, 2 ON THE
LAW AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39 (1968); POTHIER, supra note 247, at Nos. 27-28..
250 LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, 49(2) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 62 (4th ed.
2004) (emphasis added).
251 Wright v. Howard, (1823) 57 Eng. Rep. 76, 79, Vice-Chancellor's Courts.
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ownership.2 5 2 Following this, many English cases continued to conceive of water as
incapable of being owned.25 3
After the American Revolution and throughout the early and mid-
nineteenth century, the United States adopted the English model of sovereign
control of water, but with a democratic twist. 254 Early United States jurisprudence
reasoned that the federal government inherited waterbeds and water, and then
transferred title to each state as it entered the Union.2 55 The twist was that, because
the "people" are sovereign in America, the states held title to water and other wild
resources on behalf of their collective citizens, not on behalf of the Crown as a
256sovereign entity.
American law, relying on English precedents, has always made clear that
one cannot own water itself, but merely have a right of use:
Flowing water, as well as light and air, are in one sense 'publici juris.'
They are a boon from providence to all, and differ only in their mode of enjoyment.
Light and air are diffused in all directions, flowing water in some. When property
was established, each one had the right to enjoy the light and air diffused over, and
the flowing water through, the portion of soil belonging to him. The property in the
water itself was not in the proprietor of the land through which it passes, but only
252 Mason v. Hill, (1832) 110 Eng. Rep. 114, 117, King's Bench.
253 McCarter v. Hudson Cty. Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 525 (1905); Embrey v. Owen, (1851) 155
Eng. Rep. 579, 579, 6 Exch. 353 ("Flowing water is publici juris, not in the sense that it is bonum
vacans, to which the first occupant may acquire an exclusive right, but that it is public and common in
this sense only: that all may reasonably use it who have a right of access to it; that none can have any
property in the water itself, except in the particular portion which he may choose to abstract from the
stream and take into his possession, and that during the time of possession only."); Race v. Ward, (1855)
119 Eng. Rep. 259, 259 4 E. & B. 702, 702; Manning v. Wasdale, (1836) 111 Eng. Rep. 1353, 1354, 5
Ad. & E. 758, 758; See also Challenor v. Thomas, (1608) 80 Eng. Rep. 96, 96.
254. See Stockton v. Balt. & N.Y. R.R. Co., 32 F. 9, 19-21 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887).
255 Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842) (The tide-based navigation distinction was
the initial rule in the colonies, but later courts shifted to conclude that states holds presumptive title to
navigable waters even if they are not subject to the tide.); see, e.g., Elder v. Burrus, 25 Tenn. (1 Hum.)
358, 365-67 (1845); Bullock v. Wilson, 2 Port. 436, 444-45 (Ala. 1835); Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. (2
Dev.) 30, 30 (1828); Cates' Ex'rs v. Wadlington, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 580, 580 (1822); Carson v.
Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 475 (Pa. 1810); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 31 (1894) (By the late nineteenth
century, "the now prevailing doctrine" was that states controlled "title in the soil of rivers really
navigable."); see generally Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of
State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 801-02 (2010).
256 See Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837)
(Baldwin, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[b]y the common law, it is clear, that all arms of the sea,
coves, creeks, etc. where the tide ebbs and flows, are the property of the sovereign. . . 'the principles of
the common law were well understood by the colonial legislature," but that this title is held on behalf of
U.S. citizens); Stockton v. Balt. & N.Y. R.R. Co., 32 F. at 19 ("The information rightly states that prior
to the Revolution the shore and lands under water of the navigable streams and waters of the province of
New Jersey belonged to the king of Great Britain, as part of the jura regalia of the crown, and devolved
to the state by right of conquest. The information does not state, however, what is equally true, that after
the conquest the said lands were held by the state, as they were by the king, in trust for the public uses of
navigation and fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves, piers, light-houses, beacons, and other
facilities of navigation and commerce."). As we will see below, many states have adopted this position.
While some other states have adopted the old English approach.
WATERS OF THE STATE
the use of it, as it passes along, for the enjoyment of his property, and as incidental
to it.257
The English law, at least as stated, if not applied, was equally clear that
water is not property capable of ownership. The Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone,
in Halsbury's Laws of England,258 stated:
Although certain rights as regards flowing water are incident to the
ownership of riparian property, the water itself, whether flowing in a known and
defined channel or percolating through the soil, is not, at common law, the subject
of property or capable of being granted to anybody."25 9
Thus, water is not property. It cannot be owned; not by the state, nor
anyone else.
CONCLUSION
So what is the legal meaning of "Waters of the State"? We began with
state assertions over territorial waters, which differ on what water they claim an
interest in, where they claim that interest comes from, and what that interest is.
Some states claim that they outright own water and some claim they have limited
regulatory rights over their water. Similarly, state courts are also divided over how
to practically treat state rights over water. Most states treat their relationship with
water as one of sovereign regulation, not traditional property ownership. The
state's sovereignty goes beyond general police powers to a more fundamental
interest in water that can trump private property rights. Only a small number of
states, either statutorily, constitutionally, or judicially, have taken full, property-like
ownership over water.
Words have meanings, thus calling state water "property" would have
significant doctrinal implications. Private rights flow from state rights to water. If
states own the water as property, how can their citizens own it, too? The balance of
powers between the federal government and states, as well as the rights of states
with respect to neighboring states (i.e., water federalism), could be affected by the
question of water as state property. Specifically, the types and nature of legal
actions states can take against other states, private entities, and the federal
government when their interests in territorial water are impacted depends
fundamentally on whether the state is taking legal action as the owner of water as
property, or in some other sovereign capacity.
257. People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 160, 91 N.W. 211, 212-13 (1902) (citing Wood v. Wand, 3
Exch. 748). The court relied extensively on the English common law, which similarly made clear that
persons cannot own or possess water; LORD HAILSHAM supra note 250. Lord Denman wrote: "No one
ha[s] any property in the water itself" Williams v. Moreland, reported by Sir John Leach in Reports of
Cases Decided in the High Court of Chancery (1843), stated: "Flowing water is originally publici juris,"
and "running water is not in its nature . .. property." Williams v. Moreland, (1824), 107 E.R. 620
(K.B.).
258. Lord Hailsham, supra note 250, at 62.
259. Wright v. Howard, (1823) 57 Eng. Rep. 76, 79, Vice-Chancellor's Courts; Mason v. Hill,
(1832) 110 Eng. Rep. 114, 117, King's Bench; see also Manning v. Wasdale, (1836) 111 Eng. Rep.
1353, 1354, 5 Ad. & E. 758, 758; Challenor v. Thomas, (1608) 80 Eng. Rep. 96, 96; McCarter v.
Hudson Cty. Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 525 (1905).
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Calling something "property" also has cultural and legal significance. A
long line of scholars have persuasively questioned the significance and meaning of
the term to the point that it is nothing but an empty space in which to put various
rights and interests. Yet "property" persists. In popular use, property gives its
owner special rights, and while first-year law students learn those rights are far
from absolute, they are distinct from whatever interest the public has in the thing at
issue. Our legal system treats almost every tangible thing, and many intangible
things, as property. Our culture, even our language, leaves little room for anything
that is not a person or property that a person can own. What would we even call
that which is not property and cannot ever be owned? (Lawyers get to rely on
Latin).
But water is the exception. The physical and social realities of water -
most notably that it is fluid and a public necessity - have rounded its corners such
that it would not fit in the square hole of property. Admittedly, we all, from the
highest appellate courts to the basest casebook authors, have used the term
"property" to describe water. Certainly, in the context of private persons and
parties, calling water one's property is simply legally incorrect. And we conclude
the words of ownership and property similarly have no place in "waters of the
state."
Instead, as a matter of both federal and state law, the public trust doctrine
best describes state powers over water. Perhaps more than any other legal authority,
it creates unique state rights and duties with respect to water. The public trust
doctrine makes clear that state title is not one of ownership, and the water itself is
certainly not state property. Rather, the water is a public good, the public are its
beneficiaries, and the state is merely the trustee, who is empowered to protect and
constrain from alienation and degradation. In short, the state does not own water as
property but is the lawful steward of the resource for us all. "Waters of the State" is
not a claim of ownership, but rather an acknowledgment of the sovereign power to
protect and steward our most precious public resource.
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